United Nations Operation in Somalia II

This study investigates UN unity of effort and U.S. unity of command of forces in Somalia from Operation Restore Hope throughout United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The United States, having directed a successful United Task Force coalition effort, transferred command to the UN in May 1993 and took a supporting role. The study documents military history in Somalia and analyzes command relationships of American units and multinational contingents. Research demonstrates that, following the transition to UNOSOM II, unit of command did not exist for the U.S. force commander in Somalia (USFORSCOM) and unity of effort was not achieved by the UN. Command of U.S. forces was retained by individual unit commanders or by the geographic commanders in chief (CINC) himself. The senior American officer in-theater, USFORSCOM, dual-hatted as the deputy UN force commander, was not in the direct chain of command of U.S. contingent forces. Likewise, UN contingents failed to support the UN Force Commander. This study suggests that unity of command of U.S. forces in theater is a prerequisite for successful military operations whether they are U.S.-led or UN operations.